Requiem for a Nascent Democracy
From the ruins of a twelve year civil war, Burundi held presidential elections in August of 2005 to a great deal of optimism. Only a decade later, the country is once again in crisis; there are genuine fears of Burundi slipping into a Rwanda-like massacre.
On April 25th this year, Pierre Nkurunziza, the incumbent President of Burundi, announced he would be running for a third term in the 2015 presidential election. Protests immediately broke out across the country, especially in the capital city of Bujumbura, on the grounds that his run for a third term would be a violation of the constitution. Nkurunziza’s cabinet maintained the constitutionality of his candidacy, citing that he was only elected once by popular vote — in 2010 — whereas his appointment in 2005 was by parliamentary vote and thus should not count.
The president and his ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), have been in power since 2005, when the civil war that broke out in 1993 between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups finally ended. The CNDD-FDD were the main Hutu rebel group during the war and Nkurunziza was the party’s chairman until he won the parliamentary elections in 2005.
Stuttering on the Path to Democracy
The 2005 elections represented the end of the civil war and a pivot towards order. Upon assuming the presidency in August 2005, Nkurunziza quickly set about consolidating Burundi’s transition towards a constitutional democracy. He led a government and cabinet that, although dominated by the CNDD-FDD, brought various ethnic and political groups into the fold. And in 2007, Burundi joined the East African Community — a regional intergovernmental organization — and reconstituted the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries with Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Despite these moves towards greater political and economic security, instability persisted in the form of armed conflict between the main opposition insurgency group — the FNL (National Liberation Forces) — and the government over the release of political prisoners from the civil war. These violent clashes reached a critical point during the 2008 siege of Bujumbura, when South African diplomats intervened to mediate between Nkurunziza and the FNL. However, it remained apparent that in spite of the conflict, Burundi was taking steps to establish an institutional framework for democracy, with promising signs.
2010: The Turning Point
2010 is the year when the democratic process — which began a decade prior, with the Arusha Peace Accords of 2000 — began to unravel.
Echoing the optimism of 2005, the 2010 election was to be the next milestone in Burundi’s embrace of democracy with voting by the general public. However, claiming that the electoral commission — in conspiracy with the CNDD-FDD — intended to rig the election, the opposition candidates boycotted and withdrew their candidacies during the month of the elections. This left Nkurunziza as the last remaining choice.
With only one candidate on the ballot, Nkurunziza was re-elected with 92% of the vote. Meanwhile, the main opposition leader, Agathon Rwasa of the FNL, fled the country on suspicion that he would be arrested for planning a new insurgency.
Low voter turnout, suspected political assassinations and a litany of grenade attacks in Bujumbura before and after the elections — not to mention the sham of the ballot itself — exposed just how far from political freedom Burundi really was. Ultimately, the 2010 elections only aggravated political fractures and civil disillusionment.
Unsurprisingly, Burundi has since been governed under increasingly authoritarian rule, with widespread corruption and extrajudicial killings par for the course.
Anatomy of a Crisis
With the CNDD-FDD’s nomination of Nkurunziza for the presidency in 2015 and the ensuing demonstrations, the government denounced the unrest and employed violent measures to quell the uprising. Tensions between protesters and the military before elections in July led to an estimated 70 deaths. The uncertainty over the exact figures arise from the CNDD-FDD’s strategy of widespread press and media censorship.
When demonstrations failed to subside, the question of Nkurunziza’s eligibility for the office of President was taken to the Constitutional Court. On May 5th 2015, the court ruled that Nkurunziza was eligible to stand for a third term, though there was suspicion of foul play.
This sentiment was quickly reinforced when the court's Vice President, Sylvere Nimpagaritse, fled to Rwanda, claiming that most of the court judges had been threatened to rule in favor of Nkurunziza.. Nimpagaritse’s revelation was instrumental in enabling prominent opposition leaders to mobilize support against the government
With political and civil order unraveling so rapidly, it did not come as a shock when a coup was launched on May 13th by elements in the military opposed to Nkurunziza's candidacy. However, loyalist soldiers quickly reasserted their control and the President responded by deploying heavily armed forces in Bujumbura and dismissing three complicit ministers from his cabinet.
Throughout the outbreak and deterioration of the crisis, members of the international community from the African Union to Belgium called for the elections to be delayed. However, the CNDD-FDD rejected this and the election proceeded on July 21st, despite yet another opposition boycott. On July 24th the electoral commission announced that Nkurunziza had emerged the victor with 69.4% of the votes.
Awkward Neighborhood
Before the Burundian crisis had broken out and Nkurunziza had officially announced his intent to run for re-election, Rwandan President Paul Kagame tweeted his disdain for the prospect without a hint of irony. The attempted coup on May 13th in Burundi deepened Nkurunziza’s distrust of Rwanda on the suspicion that Kagame had been backing his opponents and was harboring the coup-plotters.
Burundi has also appealed to Rwanda for the extradition of persons of interest in the assassination of Adolphe Nshimirimana, Nkurunziza’s right-hand man and security chief. While this may seem incriminating on Rwanda’s part, it must be taken into perspective that the country harbors some 72,000 Burundian refugees, many of them being anti-establishment journalists and opposition figures.
Rwanda has grievances with Burundi on two grounds: the unexplained arrest of Rwandans in Burundi; and the suspicion that Burundi is backing Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) Hutu rebels. The FDLR rebels are considered by Rwanda to be the greatest threat to the state’s stability because some in the FDLR were among those responsible for the genocide of 1994. Isolated in recent years to the DRC, Kigali’s accusation is that the Hutu-majority Burundian government is providing a haven for elements of the FDLR.
Moving Forward
Burundi’s future looks bleak. In the short to medium term at least, the country is governed by an authoritarian regime of questionable legitimacy and the prospects of a change in leadership are unlikely, barring another military coup or civil war. Neither of these are particularly desirable, and Burundians are caught in the unenviable dilemma of either persisting with a dictatorial establishment for the near future or waging a violent uprising that could set back an already underdeveloped country by decades.
On the international level, the continued rule of Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD is heightening tensions in a region where ethnic groups are dispersed across borders and are undergoing a resurgence of animosity. There is no easy-fix solution for Burundi, and its future outlook is especially sobering when framed in the context of 2005’s palpable anticipation.
But even more concerning is the precedent that Nkurunziza can set for other African heads-of-state. As Nkurunziza announced his intent to run for a third presidential term, Presidents Sassuo Nguesso of the Republic of Congo and Paul Kagame of Rwanda began exploring the possibility of constitutional referendums permitting them to do the same.
In a continent still emerging from a recent history of corruption and political repression, a return to governance without term limits would totally undermine the political development process.
Somalia's interest to Burundi stems from the manipulation of the country's massive military contribution to AMISOM. Much like Uganda, Burundi has avoided reproach and sanctions from the AU by the implicit threat of withdrawing troops from the mission. There are few other political or economic points of interest of note.
